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OIL AND GAS TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE
OKLAHOMA SECURITIES ACT-A SCHEME
OF INVESTORS' INSURANCE?
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1976 the Oklahoma legislature amended the Oklahoma Securi-
ties Act' to include oil and gas interests within the definition of a secur-
ity.' This amended definition, however, has two important exclusions.
First, it excludes those transactions between persons engaged in the ex-
ploration for or production of oil and gas.' The amended definition
also excludes the execution of leases by the owners of land, mineral, or
royalty interests, but only so long as the execution is in favor of persons
engaged in the exploration for or production of oil and gas.4 The obvi-
ous purpose of these exclusions was to except from the purview of the
Act intra-industry transactions, presumably because investors in these
type transactions were seen as not requiring the protection of the Act.
Notwithstanding the breadth of these two exclusions, the amended
definition includes several other situations in which the investor also
does not need the protection of the Act. In failing to address these
situations, the Oklahoma legislature has created a virtually risk-free av-
enue into speculation on oil, gas, and other mineral interests. If, for
example, an unregistered oil and gas transaction not involving the ex-
clusions were to transpire and subsequently prove unfruitful, the Act
would, under some circumstances, allow the purchaser to rescind the
entire transaction and recover any consideration tendered.' By provid-
ing this avenue through which investors can avoid the economic risks
normally accompanying oil and gas development, the legislature has
1. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, §§ 1-504 (1971).
2. 1976 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 89 § I, (codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 2(20)(R) (Supp.
1979).
3. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 2(20)(R) (Supp. 1979).
4. Id.
5. The Oklahoma courts have long held that the intent of the securities laws was "to prevent
stockholders and promoters from perpetrating frauds and impositions on unsuspecting investors
in hazardous undertakings; [and] to protect credulous and incompetent persons from their own
inclinations to speculate in hazardous enterprises . Hornaday v. State, 21 Okla. Crim. 354,
361-62, 208 P. 228, 231 (1922).
6. See notes 59-78 infra and accompanying text.
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effectively provided such investors with an insurance scheme to protect
their investment.
This note initially presents a general overview of the Act and
briefly discusses the importance of avoiding security classification. Sec-
ond, an examination of the types of oil and gas transactions included
within the definition of a security under the Oklahoma Securities Act
and the reasons for their inclusion is presented. Concurrent with this
examination, the exclusions described above will be analyzed.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of the Oklahoma Securities Act
The Oklahoma Securities Act7 is generally patterned after the Uni-
form Securities Act' which has been adopted by thirty-four states.9
The Oklahoma Act is divided into six articles. Article One includes a
definitional section"0 and created the Oklahoma Securities Commis-
sion.t1 Numerous lengthy definitions are codified in this article. These
include the definitions of "agent,"12 "broker-dealer," '3 "investment ad-
viser,"14 "issuer," 5"nonissuer,"' 6 and "security." 7
Article Two consists of two sections which define "fraudulent
practices" within the meaning of the Act. Section 101 of Article Two is
nearly identical to Securities and Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5'8
7. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, §§ 1-504 (1971). For a detailed discussion of the Oklahoma Act see
Dorwart & Holden, An Overview of the Oklahoma Securities Act, 25 OKLA. L. Rav. 184 (1972).
8. Annot., 7A U.L.A. 561 (1978).
9. Id. at 81 (Supp. 1980).
10. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 2 (1971).
11. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 3 (1971).
12. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 2(4) (Supp. 1979).
13. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 2(5) (Supp. 1979).
14. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 2(8) (Supp. 1979).
15. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 2(9) (Supp. 1979).
16. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 2(I1) (Supp. 1979).
17. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 2(20) (Supp. 1979).
18. Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979).
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and renders it u*nlawful for any person to make any fraudulent misrep-
resentations or omissions, or to otherwise engage in any type of fraudu-
lent activities in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of a
security. 9 Section 102 makes it unlawful for an investment adviser
compensated by another person to engage in fraudulent practices
against that other person.20
The registration requirements for broker-dealers, agents, and in-
vestment advisers are found in Article Three,2 t while the registration
requirements of a security and the procedure for doing so are contained
in Article Four.22 If a security is exempt from registration then, of
course, the registration requirements of Article Four need not be met. 3
The various securities and transactions which are exempt from registra-
tion are enumerated in Section 401 of Article Five.24 The exemptions
are numerous and closely resemble the exemptions under the federal
securities laws.25 Article Five also contains general provisions for the
19. Compare § 101 with Rule lOb-5. Section 101 states:
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any
security, directly or indirectly
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they are made, not misleading,
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 101 (1971).
20. Section 102 provides in pertinent part:
(a) It is unlawful for any person who receives any consideration from another per-
son primarily for advising the other person as to the value of securities or their purchase
or sale, whether through the issuance of analyses or reports or otherwise,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud the other person, or
(2) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the other person.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 102 (1971).
21. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 201 (1971) makes it unlawful for any broker-dealer, agent, or in-
vestment adviser to transact business in that capacity without first registering with the Securities
Administrator. The procedure for registration is found in OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 202 (Supp. 1979);
post-registration provisions are in OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 203 (1971); and denial, revocation, sus-
pension, cancellation, and withdrawal of registration are in OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 204 (1971).
22. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, §§ 301-306 (1971 & Supp. 1979).
23. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 301 (1971). See generally Dorwart & Holden, An Overview of the
Oklahoma Securities Act, 25 OKLA. L. REV. 184 (1972); Long, Exemptions Under the Oklahoma
Securities Act. Part P The Governmental and Financial Institutional Exemptions, 28 OKLA. L.
REV. 235 (1975); Mabey & Smith, The Elusive Limited Offering Exemption of the Utah Utnforin
Securities Act, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 825.
24. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 401 (Supp. 1979).
25. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976), and Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1976). Section 401 of the Oklahoma Act exempts eleven types of
securities and sixteen types of transactions. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 401 (Supp. 1979). By compari-
son, the Securities Act of 1933 exempts eleven types of securities and five types of transactions, 15
3
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administrative, injunctive, criminal, and civil remedies created by the
Act.
Of paramount importance is Section 408 of Article Five, which
creates civil liabilities for those who offer or sell securities in violation
of the Act26 or who materially participate in, or aid, a person who offers
or sells securities in violation of the Act.' A purchaser of securities
sold in violation of the Act has a private cause of action in either of two
situations. First, if the securities sold were not registered then the pur-
chaser can rescind the transaction.28 Rescission is also available if ma-
terial, untrue statements or omissions are made in connection with the
offer or sale of the securities.29 Neither reliance by the plaintiff nor
intent to defraud by the defendant need be proved.3" This section also
contains the statute of limitations applicable to a civil action pursuant
to the Act.3' Finally, this section provides that no person may bring a
cause of action under the Act if that person knew at the time the cause
of action arose that the defendant was violating the Act.32 For the pur-
poses of this article this section will be viewed as providing a defense of
in pari delicto to defendants.
B. Sanctions for Violation of the Act
If a transaction is classified as a security under the Oklahoma Act,
then a host of problems is in store for the seller. First, the seller has the
task of complying with all registration requirements of the Act, unless
the security is exempt from registration.33 Registering a security with
the Administrator can prove to be expensive, especially for a transac-
tion involving a relatively low purchase price.34
U.S.C. §§ 77c-77d (1976) while the Securities Exchange Act exempts five types of securities. 15
U.S.C. § 78c(12) (1976).
26. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 408(a) (Supp. 1979).
27. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 408(b) (Supp. 1979).
28. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 408(a) (Supp. 1979).
29. Id.
30. Id. See Dorwart & Holden, An Overview ofthe Oklahoma Securities Act, 25 OKLA. L.
REV. 184 (1972).
31. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 408(e) (Supp. 1979). This period is two years after the contract of
sale.
32. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 408(0 (Supp. 1979). Prior to the adoption of the Oklahoma Act in
1959, it was unsettled whether a purchaser of securities had recourse via the Oklahoma courts in a
cause of action arising out of a transaction in which he was inpari delicto. See L. Loss, SECURI-
TIES REGULATION 973 (1951). Undoubtedly, the intent of section 408(0 is to bar those potential
plaintiffs who had knowledge of the alleged violation at the time of the sale of the securities.
33. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 301 (1971).
34. See generaly Comment, The One-Two Combination: Will Federal and State Securities
Regulation Knock Out Small Business?, 14 TULSA L.J. 132 (1978).
1980]
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If the seller fails to register the offering, the Act grants the pur-
chaser a prima facie cause of action to rescind the entire transaction
regardless of the presence or absence of any fraudulent practices com-
mitted by the seller.35 The injured purchaser can recover all considera-
tion36 and will most likely be entitled to include all amounts expended
in connection with the post-purchase development of the interests. 3 7
Thus, if a disgruntled purchaser of an oil and gas interest can establish
that the transaction was a security within the meaning of the Act and
that the security was not registered, then, absent any applicable exemp-
tion from registration, the purchaser can recoup the consideration paid
for the interests plus all costs incurred in developing the interest.
Even though the security is registered or exempt from registration,
additional problems may be encountered. Exemption from registration
does not exempt the security or the transaction from the antifraud pro-
visions of the Act.3 8 The elements of a cause of action for securities
fraud are much less stringent than those associated with common law
fraud. 39 As previously mentioned, the elements of reliance and intent
need not be proven.40 All that must be shown is that the seller made a
35. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 408(a) (Supp. 1979).
36. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 408(a) (Supp. 1979) allows for recovery of consideration, reason-
able attorneys' fees, costs, and interest at ten percent per year from the date of payment less the
amount of any income received on the security. Damages are recoverable if the purchaser no
longer owns the security, and are equal to "the amount that would be recoverable upon a tender
less the value of the security when the buyer disposed of it and interest at ten percent (10%) per
year from the date of disposition." Id.
37. See Cross v. Pasley, 270 F.2d 88 (8th Cir. 1959); Whittaker v. Wall, 226 F.2d 868 (8th Cir.
1955). In Whillaker the court held that where a purchaser of working interests in oil and gas
leases prevailed in an action against the seller under Section 12(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 771(1) (1976), by virtue of the seller's failure to register the offer and sale of the interests,
the purchaser was entitled to recover all amounts expended in connection with the development of
the interests in addition to the consideration paid in the first place. 226 F.2d at 872. The same
result was reached under the Missouri Securities Act in Cross. 270 F.2d at 95. Oklahoma courts
would most likely follow these results because decisions under the federal securities laws are
looked to in interpreting state securities laws. See, e.g., State ex rel. Day v. Petco Oil & Gas, Inc.,
558 P.2d 1163 (Okla. 1977); see generally Dorwart & Holden, An Overview o//he Oklahoma Securi-
tiesAclt, 25 OKLA. L. REV., 184 187 n.19 (1972); Loss, supra note 21, at 44-48. Further, it is the
statutory policy under the Oklahoma Act to construe the Act in conformity with other states,
OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 501 (1971); State v. Hoephner, 574 P.2d 1079 (Okla. Crim. 1978),
38. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, §§ 407-408 (Supp. 1979).
• 39. To prove actionable fraud under Oklahoma law the plaintiffmust prove that the defend-
ant made a material misrepresentation that was false; the defendant knew at the time of making
the misrepresentation that it was false, or that it was made recklessly without any knowledge of its
truth and made as a positive assertion; the defendant made the misrepresentation with the inten-
tion that it should be acted upon by the plaintiff; and the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the
misrepresentation and thereby suffered injury. D&H Co., Inc. v. Shultz, 579 P.2d 821, 824 (Okla.
1978); State ex rel Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Brown, 519 P.2d 491 (Okla. 1974); Lenn v.
Miller, 403 P.2d 458 (Okla. 1965).
40. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
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material, untrue statement or omission in connection with the offer or
sale of the interest. It is unlikely that a seller of an interest in oil and
gas who is lacking knowledge of the securities laws would recognize his
duty to disclose every detail of the interest. Rather, a good faith seller
would only feel compelled to temper his puffing sufficiently to take him
out of the realm of common law fraud.
Finally, the Oklahoma Act provides for criminal sanctions against
a person who willfully violates the provisions of the Act. Section 407 of
the Act makes it a felony to violate the Act and subjects the violator to
a possible five thousand dollar fine and imprisonment for up to three
years.41 An average of twelve sanctions a year under this section are
successfully prosecuted by the Administrator.42 Obviously it is in the
best interests of the seller of an oil and gas interest to avoid having the
interest classified as a security.
III. CLASSIFYING OIL AND GAS INTERESTS AS SECURITIES
A. Pre-1976
Prior to 1976 Oklahoma did not expressly classify interests in oil
and gas leases as securities.43  This did not, however, restrain
Oklahoma courts from holding that the sale of oil and gas interests
could be securities under Oklahoma law. In State ex rel. Day v. Petco
Oil & Gas, Inc.,' the Oklahoma Securities Commission sued an oil
and gas company which had developed an investment transaction
package consisting of various undivided interests in an oil and gas
lease. The Securities Commission claimed that the investment package
constituted an unregistered security and sought to enjoin Petco from
selling the interests. The package was coupled with an operating agree-
ment providing that the seller was to be the operator of the lease. Con-
sequently, the purchasers were deprived of control over the
management of the project. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that
the involvement of oil and gas interests in the investment package did
not exempt the transaction from the purview of the Oklahoma Securi-
ties Act. The court found that the package was an investment contract
41. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 407(a) (Supp. 1979).
42. Letter from Mary Copeland, Administrative Assistant to the Oklahoma Securities Com-
mission, to Wm. Lane Pennington (Jan. 31, 1980).
43. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 2(1) (1971) (current version at OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 2(20)).
44. 558 P.2d 1163 (Okla. 1977).
1980]
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and hence a security covered by the Act.45 In reaching this decision,
the court focused on the contribution of risk capital by the purchasers
and the purchasers' lack of direct control over the project. The court
stated:
The package sold by Petco requires the investment of
money.
The package sold by Petco takes investor's money and
subjects it to the risk of the venture, thus constituting risk cap-
ital.
The package sold by Petco offers to the investors an ex-
pectation of a benefit, in this instance a profit.
The package sold by Petco provided that the investors
would have no direct control over the investment or policy
decision of the venture. It is clear from the operation agree-
ment, that any profit or benefit to be derived from a lease-
holder's investment is to be the product of the actions and
decisions of the operator and that the investors do not partici-
pate in the decisions and actions involved.46
Several tests have been developed for ascertaining whether a
transaction constitutes an investment contract.47 But regardless of the
test adopted by the Oklahoma court, pre-1976 oil and gas transactions
45. Id. at 1167. The definition of a security within the meaning of the Act includes an invest-
ment contract. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 2(20)(K) (Supp. 1979).
46. 558 P.2d at 1167.
47. The term "investment contract" was first construed in 1920, State v. Gopher Tire & Rub-
ber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937 (1920), and has since gained wide recognition as a type of
security. Long, State Securities Regulation-An Overview, 32 OKLA. L. REv. 541, 559 (1979). It is
perhaps the most frequently used of the general terms within the definition of a security, id.,
particularly under the federal securities laws. At least four definitions of an investment contract
have been adopted by various state and federal courts. Id. The most widely accepted of these is
the Howey test handed down by the United States Supreme Court in SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328
U.S. 293 (1946). An investment contract under the Howey test is: "(1) the investment of money,
(2) in a common enterprise, (3) with the expectation of a profit, (4) with that profit to be realized
through the efforts of someone other than the investor." Long, supra, at 560.
In 1973 Oklahoma adopted a codification of the Howey test defining a security as any "in-
vestment of money or money's worth including goods furnished and/or services performed in the
risk capital of a venture with the expectation of some benefit to the investor where the investor has
no direct control over the investment or policy decision of the venture." 1973 Okla. Sess. Laws,
ch. 162 § I (codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 2(20)(P) (Supp. 1979)).
The analysis utilized by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in elceo Oil & Gas, Inc., however,
closely resembles the "risk-capital" test handed down by the California Supreme Court in Silver
Hills Country Club . Sobieski. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961). The risk-
capital test consists of three elements: an investment, of risk capital in an enterprise, and the
expectation of a benefit. Id. at _ 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
Another of the investment contract definitions which has gained wide acceptance, particu-
larly in state courts, is a combined risk-capital-Howey test. See, e.g., Schultz v. Rector-Phillip-
Morse, Inc., 552 S.W.2d 4 (Ark. 1977); State v. George, 50 Ohio App. 2d 297, 362 N.E.2d 1223
(1975); Pratt v. Kross, 555 P.2d 765 (Or. 1976). See generally Long, State Securities Regulation-
7
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were safe from the reach of the Oklahoma Act as long as the transac-
tion did not take on the character of an investment contract. Individu-
als and companies were free, with the above noted qualification, to sell
or purchase oil and gas interests without worry of the sanctions of the
Act. Investments in oil and gas interests remained a risk-capital ven-
ture48 for both the initial purchaser of the interest and the investors in
the development of the interest. The Act allowed restraint-free trading
of oil and gas interests while simultaneously protecting investors,
through the definition of an investment contract as a security, from
fraudulent schemes of unscrupulous promoters.
B. The 1976 Amendment
The Oklahoma Act was amended in 1976 to include within the
definition of a security certain oil and gas transactions.49 This present
definition states that a security includes any:
interest in oil, gas, or mineral lease except that transactions
involving leases or interests therein, between parties, each of
whom is engaged in the business of exploring for or produc-
ing oil and gas or other valuable minerals as an ongoing busi-
ness, and the execution of oil and gas leases by land, mineral
and royalty owners in favor of a party or parties engaged in
the business of exploring for or producing oil and gas or other
valuable minerals shall be deemed not to involve a security.50
An Oyerview, 32 OKLA. L. REv. 541, 559 (1979). In State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 485 P.2d
105 (Hawaii 1971), the Hawaii Supreme Court said an investment contract is created whenever:
(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and
(2) a portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the enterprise, and
(3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offeror's promises or representa-
tions which give rise to a reasonable understanding that a valuable benefit of some
kind, over and above the initial value, will accrue to the offeree as a result of the
operation of the enterprise, and
(4) the offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and actual control over the
managerial decisions of the enterprise.
id. at 109.
One commentator states that the combined risk-capital-Howey test will eventually replace the
Howej test as the leading test for investment contracts. He argues that "[t]he test in general
appears more clearly to define investment contracts, as well as the very essence of [what] a 'secur-
ity' is than does its Howey counterpart." Long, State Securities Regulation-An Overview, 32
OKLA. L. REV. 541, 559 (1979).
48. A risk-capital venture has been defined by the Oklahoma Supreme Court as being a
venture wherein one takes an investor's money and subjects it to the risks of the venture. State ex
rel. Day v. Petco Oil & Gas, Inc., 558 P.2d 1163 (Okla. 1977).
49. See notes 1-2 supra and accompanying text.
50. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 2(20)(R) (Supp. 1979). By comparison, the Securities Act of 1933
includes within the definition of a security a "fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other
mineral rights." 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1976). The Uniform Securities Act includes a "certificate of
8
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The exception created by this definition is two-pronged. First, a trans-
action between parties engaged in the oil and gas business on an ongo-
ing basis is not a security. Second, leases by land, mineral, and royalty
owners to those engaged in the oil and gas business on an ongoing basis
are also excepted. On its face, however, this definition appears not to
except from the definition the execution of oil and gas leases by a land,
mineral, or royalty owner in favor of one not engaged in the explora-
tion for or production of oil and gas and other valuable minerals on an
ongoing basis; sales by persons not engaged in the exploration for or
production of oil and gas on an ongoing basis and not a land, mineral,
or royalty owner; or execution of a coal lease by a land, royalty, and
mineral owner in favor of one engaged in the coal industry on an ongo-
ing basis.
Moreover, the availability of the exclusion could very well turn on
the interpretation granted the phrase "as an ongoing business." A lit-
eral reading of the definition might include as a security the sale of a
mineral leasehold by a person who had purchased the lease with the
intent of exploring for or producing oil and gas, but who, for any
number of reasons, did not reach that plateau and decided to sell out.
Or, a company engaged in the production of or exploration for oil and
gas utilizing a blind commission" technique of selling its interest to
another similarly situated business, could find itself liable as a material
participant52 in the sale of unregistered securities if the third party
salesman was not engaged in an ongoing business of producing or ex-
ploring for oil and gas.
The amendment also apparently includes within the definition of a
security the sale of a royalty interest if both parties to the transaction
are not engaged in the exploration and production of oil and gas. In
doing so, the coverage of the Act extends beyond those oil and gas
transactions which come within the purview of the federal securities
laws.53 While the federal laws require fractionalization of an interest
owned by the seller before the interest sold will be deemed a security,54
interest or participation in an oil, gas, or mining title or lease or in payments out of production
under such title or lease." 7A U.L.A. § 401(1) (1978).
51. A blind commission entails a situation where a salesman, not wanting the owner of the
interests to know the amount of commission that he will receive on any given sale, will agree to
locate a purchaser for the owner. The owner agrees that once a suitable purchaser is found, the
owner will transfer the interests to the salesman for a pre-negotiated price. The salesman then
sells his newly-obtained interests to the purchaser.
52. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 408(b) (Supp. 1979).
53. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1976). The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has held that "[tlo
[Vol. 15:580
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the Oklahoma Act does not contain such a requirement. Thus, any
royalty owner, other than those who fit within the exploration and pro-
duction company exception, who sells his interest in whole, or in part,
will have sold a security within the meaning of the Oklahoma Act.
Contemporaneously with the adoption of the definitional amend-
ment to the Act, the Oklahoma legislature enacted an exemption aimed
exclusively at the offer or sale of an oil and gas interest." This private
placement exemption was an attempt by the legislature to alleviate
some of the hardships incurred by having oil and interests classified as
securities. As will be discussed later,56 the exemption does provide
some relief, but like its definitional counterpart,57 it includes within the
purview of the Act certain oil and gas transactions in which the pur-
chaser does not need the protection of the Act.
1. Execution of Oil and Gas Leases by Land, Mineral, or
Royalty Owners
As previously noted,5" the definition of a security under the
Oklahoma Act excludes the execution of oil and gas leases by land,
mineral, or royalty owners so long as the execution is in favor of one
be an 'issuer' of fractional interests, hence the 'issuer' of a security within [15 U.S.C. § 77b(l)], the
[sellers of fractional interests in oil and gas leases] must have been the owners of the oil and gas
rights and they must have created fractional interests therein for the purpose of a public offering."
Woodard v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108, 114 (10th Cir. 1959).
55. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 401(b)(15)A (Supp. 1979). This section exempts certain transac-
tions including
A. Any Sale from or in this state to not more than thirty-two persons of a unit
consisting of: interests in oil, gas or mining title(s) or lease(s) . . if
1. The seller above reasonably believes that all buyers are purchasing for invest-
ment;
2. No commission or other remuneration is paid or given directly or indirectly for
the solicitation of any such sale excluding any commission or remuneration paid or given
by and between parties each of whom is engaged in the business of exploring for or
producing oil and gas or other valuable minerals;
3. No public advertising or public solicitation is used in any such solicitation or
sale; and
4. Sales are effected only to persons the seller has reasonable cause to believe are
capable of evaluating the risk of the prospective investment and able to bear the eco-
nomic risk of the investment; but the Administrator may, by rule or order, as to any
specific transaction, withdraw or further condition this exemption or decrease the
number of sales permitted or waive the conditions and clauses 1, 2 and 3, with or without
substitution of a limitation on remuneration.
B. For the purpose of the foregoing transactional exemption, no units by the issuer
or associates shall be integrated, however this exemption cannot be combined or used in
conjunction with any other transactional exemption.
Id.
56. See notes 64-65 infra and accompanying text.
57. See notes 5-6 supra and accompanying text.
58. See notes 48-50 supra and accompanying text.
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engaged in exploration or production of oil and gas on an ongoing ba-
sis. This exclusion, however, does not insure that the execution of a
lease by a landowner will, in all circumstances, be outside the purview
of the Act. Suppose a lease broker purchases a lease from a landowner
with the intent of selling this interest to an exploration and production
company. A literal reading of the definition would include this trans-
action within the definition of a security. First, the definition makes no
attempt to define "in the business of exploring for or producing oil and
gas . . . -.9 One must question whether a lease broker, when not act-
ing within the employment of an exploration or production company,60
can be said to be exploring for or producing oil and gas when he
merely is procuring leases from landowners with no intent to recover
the minerals thereunder.61
Further, even if the leasebroker is determined to be in the explora-
tion or production business, this situation could be interpreted to be a
transaction involving the sale of a security if the purchase by the lease
broker is the only exposure that he has had or intends to have with the
oil and gas industry. It is unlikely he would be deemed to be engaged
in an ongoing business as that term is used in the definition of a secur-
ity under the Act. While "ongoing business" is undefined by the Act,
common sense indicates that the term should refer to doing business
over some extended time and not to a one-time transaction. Absent
statutory clarification or judicial interpretation, the one-time or first-
time transaction by a lease broker should not render his actions on-
going. Thus, independent of whether a lease broker is interpreted to be
in the business of producing or exploring for oil and gas, any one-time
or first-time purchase by a lease broker would not entitle the transac-
tion to be excluded from the definition of a security.
59. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 401(b)(15)(A) 2 (Supp. 1979).
60. The presently controlling Oklahoma law concerning the agency relationships of a lease
broker dates back to 1917 when the Oklahoma Supreme Court held:
Where a person, knowing of lands upon which an oil and gas mining lease can be
obtained, and knowing the price at which he can obtain it, offers to sell it to another at a
fixed sum, which offer is accepted by the other, and he then procures the lease, the trans-
action is not one of agency, and the person offering the lease occupies the position of an
assignor of the lease, though the lease is made direct from the landowner to the person to
whom he has offered to sell it.
Jameson v. Goodwin, 66 Okla. 146, 148, 170 P. 241, 243 (1917) (quoting King v. Combs, 36 Okla.
396, 122 P. 181 (1912)). Both Jameson and King were cited with approval by the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit in 1960 in Appleby v. Kewanee Oil Co., 270 F.2d 334, 337 (10th Cir. 1960).
61. At least one attorney with the Oklahoma Securities Commission Department of Securi-
ties has indicated that under these circumstances a lease broker would not be considered to be
engaged in the business of exploring for or producing oil and gas. Telephone interview with
David Boxeur (Jan. 23, 1980).
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Assuming that this transaction was not registered with the Admin-
istrator, the landowner would be liable to the lease broker in an action
for rescission under either of the above two theories. A disgruntled
lease broker could not only recover the consideration, ten percent inter-
est, legal costs, and attorneys' fees, 62 he might also be entitled to recoup
any costs incurred in developing the interest.63 While the landowner
would have available at least two defenses to the lease broker's cause of
action, establishing these defenses unduly burdens the landowner.
One defense available to the landowner is the private placement
exemption provided by section 401(b)(15) of the Act. 4 To gain this
defense the landowner would have to show that he reasonably believed
that the lease broker was purchasing the lease with investment intent.
To date, however, neither the Administrator of the Department of Se-
curities of the Oklahoma Securities Commission nor the Oklahoma
courts have defined the concept of "purchasing for investment." Pre-
sumably, an administrative or judicial interpretation would closely re-
flect federal criteria of investment intent. These criteria have generally
required that the purchaser not intend to speculate on the security and
sell it immediately on the market.65 Second, if the landowner could
demonstrate that the lease broker knew at the time of the sale that the
interests being conveyed were securities and that they were not regis-
tered, then the inpari delicto defense would be available.66
It is doubtful that in most transactions these defenses could be suc-
cessfully raised. First, because the lease broker is not engaged in explo-
62. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 408 (Supp. 1979).
63. Id.
64. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 401(b)(15) (Supp. 1979).
65. J. LONG, STATE SECURITIES (BLUE SKY) REGULATION 268 (3d ed. 1978). Under federal
law "[i]t is generally considered that holding the securities purchased for two years will show the
necessary investment intent." Long, State Securities Repulation-An Overview, 32 OKLA. L. REV.
541, 560 (1979). For many years prior to the adoption of this approach
the SEC took the approach that a person taking for investment purposes could not have
any present intent to subsequently resale [sic] the securities purchased. In other words
this investment intent element was not present unless at the moment of purchase the
purchaser had the intent to retain the purchased securities permanently ...
Recognizing the difficulties here the SEC developed what they [sic] called the
"change of circumstance" doctrine to help objectively prove this subjective intent existed
at the time of purchase. The doctrine basically had two parts. First it recognized that if
the purchaser held the acquired securities for a period of time then there ought to arise a
very high presumption that the proper intent was present ...
Second the SEC required that there be some change of circumstances on the part of
the investor which was not foreseeable at the time of the purchase which caused him to
change his investment intent.
STATE SECURITIES (BLUE SKY) REGULATION, supra, at 268.
66. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
19801
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ration and production it is unlikely that he would be purchasing for
investment. Thus, the private placement exemption would probably be
unavailable. A second reason is that the knowledge of the Oklahoma
Securities Act is minimally spread throughout nonlawyer oilmen and it
is therefore doubtful that a lease broker would be aware that the inter-
est being purchased by him was a security. Hence, the lease broker
would probably be held not to have been inpari delicto with the land-
owner.
67
2. Transactions Between Two Parties, One of Whom is Not
Engaged in the Oil and Gas Business
To carry the hypothetical situation outlined above one step fur-
ther, suppose the lease broker in turn transferred his recently obtained
interest to a business engaged in exploring for or producing oil and gas
on an ongoing basis. Whether the initial lease execution by the land-
owner in favor of the lease broker is deemed to be the sale of a security
becomes immaterial at this point. Regardless of the outcome of the
landowner-lease broker dispute, the transfer by the lease broker to the
exploration and production company is a security.68 This is true be-
cause, as in the above situation, one of the parties to the transaction,
the lease broker, was not engaged in the exploration for or production
of oil and gas on an ongoing basis. Unproductive development efforts
by the purchaser could be salvaged by an action for rescission. Here
again, the consideration, ten percent interest, legal costs, attorneys' fees,
and possibly all money expended in attempting to develop the property
could be recaptured.69
The lease broker would have available the same defenses which
could be raised by the landowner in the landowner-lease broker dis-
pute, the private placement exemption 7° and inpari delicto.7' The for-
mer would again hinge on the interpretation of "investment intent."
For example, if the purchaser company retained all its interest and sub-
sequently developed the property, the lease broker would likely prevail
67. One additional argument which could be advanced by the landowner is that it was he
who was offered and sold a security. It seems that this transaction would fall within either of the
two definitions of an investment contract discussed earlier. See notes 44-49 supra and accompany-
ing text. The landowner is investing something of value ('lsths mineral interest), in a common
enterprise, with the expectation of a profit (royalties), to come solely from the efforts of others.
68. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 2(20)(R) (Supp. 1979).
69. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 408 (Supp. 1979).
70. See notes 63-66 supra and accompanying test.
71. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
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on his assertion that he reasonably believed that the purchaser com-
pany was purchasing for investment.72 On the other hand, conveyance
of the interest, in whole or in part, by the purchaser company would
tend to defeat the "purchasing for investment" element of the private
placement exemption. The position of the purchaser company would
be further enhanced if, upon selling part of its interest, it did not act as
operator of the venture.73
An additional defense that could be relied on by the lease broker is
the argument that the assignment of his leasehold interest to the explo-
ration and production company does not fall within the definition of a
security. As noted throughout this article, the Oklahoma Act excludes
from the definition of a security the execution of leases by land, min-
eral, or royalty owners in favor of persons engaged in exploration and
production of oil and gas. Strictly speaking, a leasehold owner is not a
land, mineral, or royalty owner and an assignment of a lease is not the
same as an execution of a lease. The leasebroker is, however, like the
land or mineral owner, assigning away all his executory rights. Surely,
at least for the purpose of defining a security, the assignment should be
held to be the functional equivalent of an execution of a lease by a
mineral owner. It is hoped that any court confronted with this issue
would so hold. To hold otherwise would greatly hinder leasebrokering,
an integral part of the oil and gas industry in Oklahoma.
It is important to note that the exemption from registration af-
forded by the private placement74 exemption will be defeated if any
sales are transacted through a salesperson who receives any remunera-
tion for his efforts." Suppose, for example, that in the situation posed
above, the purchaser company ultimately transferred its interest to
third party investors not engaged in the exploration for or production
of oil and gas. If salespersons are used in transferring the interest and
72. Again, recourse to the federal securities laws is helpful in defining "investment intent."
See note 64 supra. The two year holding standard presents an anomaly in the sense that the
statute of limitations is also two years. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 408(e) (Supp. 1979). Presumably,
the two year holding standard would not be determinative in this particular situation, rather, the
reasonableness of the seller's knowledge of investment intent would control. See note 64 supra.
73. If the purchaser company were the operator of the venture, then the lease broker would
be in a good position to argue that the primary intent of the purchaser company was investment.
On the other hand, the absence of the purchaser company as operator would allow the purchaser
company to assert that its primary interest in the purchase was to fractionalize and resell. This
would be true even if the purchaser company were to retain a fraction of the interest, so long as it
was not the operator of the project.
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are compensated on a cash basis or by retaining an overriding royalty
interest the exemption would not be available.76
The second possible defense, inpari delicto, also takes on the same
character as it did in the landowner-lease broker dispute. It should be
pointed out that this subsection is worded in terms of "knew" rather
than the broader standard of "knew or should have known." Again,
the defendant would be given the dubious task of proving the subjec-
tive knowledge of the purchaser company.77
3. Execution of Coal Leases by Land, Mineral, or Royalty
Owners
Another situation wherein the transaction would unwisely be in-
cluded within the definition of a security and thus would apparently
fall within the purview of the Act is the mere execution of a coal lease
by a land, mineral, or royalty owner. The definition of a security ex-
cludes "the execution of oil and gas leases in favor of a party or parties
engaged in the business of exploring for or producing oil and gas or
other valuable minerals.178 By this langauge, a coal lease would not be
covered by this exclusion. Perhaps this was merely an oversight on the
part of the drafters of the definition. Nevertheless, it could subject one
who executes a coal lease to the expense of proving either that the defi-
nition should be interpreted to exclude the execution of coal leases
from the purview of the Act or proving the defenses heretofore dis-
cussed. Again, rescission would be available to a purchaser, whether
engaged in the coal business or not, if and when the purchaser became
disgruntled with his purchase. Arguably, coal leases can be inferred to
be within the exclusion provision of the definition. For the sake of the
innocent and unsuspecting landowner, the definition should be inter-
76. The Oklahoma Supreme Court recently had before it a case concerning indirect remuner-
ation within the meaning of the private placement exemption. In Petroleum Resources Dev.
Corp. v. State ex rel. Day, 585 P.2d 346 (Okla. 1978), the petitioner, a promoter of oil and gas
drilling ventures, sought the safe harbor provided by the private placement exemption. The court
found that the exemption was defeated because supervisory fees were retained by the promoter,
These supervisory fees, actually the excess over costs of a turnkey drilling agreement, were viewed
by the court to be other remuneration and thus prohibited if the exemption were to be applicable.
The import of this decision is the breadth granted to the exemption's forbearance of commissions
paid for the solicitation ofsales. See also Schultz v. Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc., 552 S,W.2d 4
(Ark. 1977).
77. The burden of proving an exemption from registration is on the one claiming the exemp-
tion. State v. Hoephner, 574 P.2d 1079 (Okla. Crim. 1978).
78. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 2(20)(R) (Supp. 1979) (emphasis added).
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preted to exclude the execution of coal leases in the same manner it
excludes oil and gas leases.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Oklahoma Securities Act excludes from the definition of a se-
curity two types of transactions in which the parties to the transaction
do not, for the most part, need the protection of the Act. Three com-
monly occurring transactions are, however, not covered by the exclu-
sions in the definition. In all three the Act affords protection for those
least likely to need the protection of the Act. In the landowner-
leasebroker transaction, the leasebroker is afforded protection; in the
leasebroker-oil company transaction, the oil company is afforded pro-
tection; and in the execution of a coal lease to either a leasebroker or an
exploration and production company, the leasebroker or the explora-
tion and production company is afforded protection. This is unfair and
could subject the seller to the expense of proving either that no security
existed or that the transaction was exempt from registration. At the
worst, unsuspecting sellers could find themselves liable to their pur-
chasers for the consideration, all costs expended by the purchaser in
developing the interests, plus both parties' litigation expenses. The re-
sult is that a scheme of investors' insurance has been created by the
Act. The purchase and subsequent development of mineral leaseholds
is, at least in the hypothesized transactions, a virtually risk-free ven-
ture. Lease brokers, promoters, and oil businesses can purchase oil and
gas or coal leaseholds, explore for minerals thereunder, and, if the
purchased property proves to be nonproductive; sue for rescission of
the purchase price and for all amounts expended in developing the
property. If the definition is interpreted literally, purchase, exploration,
and development of properties could be done with the knowledge that
if the property were not to produce, all costs could be recouped. Surely
this was not the purpose of the Act. It has been held by many courts
that "the securities laws are aimed at qualifying the doctrine of caveat
emptor-not to establish a scheme of investor's insurance."79
It is hoped that the courts, and preferably the Oklahoma legisla-
ture, will remedy these problems. Through judicial interpretation, leg-
islative amendment, or Securities Commission rules, the red carpet
79. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965); Lane v. Midwest Bank Shares
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